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BaseCTF2024-week4&Fin-Crypto部分题目wp

时间:2024-09-15 21:03:10浏览次数:1  
标签:my self BaseCTF2024 Crypto flag import Fin def md5

week4

哎呀数据丢失了

具体分析我就不说了,最简单的证书分析,base64解码后前三个数据分别就是n,e,d。

我当时看得是公主的博客,可以参考:RSA进阶(一) - Kicky_Mu - 博客园 (cnblogs.com)

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import *


n=0x00bd278484122aef9a69ec647290219ded06edd2b7611721b326850b2f5060daeed7694356667c479ca9ccb6969f4fbe6dc7fa6759aca21d8a96a881a8e4a0217732757e649d503191511fa96da42ed1da2fa3bc8c9c65fbd9c0dd6f430359ac45e455d32c5b0ea29d21e647ff80e50abcbb80f76adb67007a04e85dbaeb4c8f1d
e=0x010001
d=0x2265e355593071ae3501062b4746b5bf7af918cebc5b46879bc3aa0b0aa4f26b68c4fdb7e29f4b2e943a6421f40abe689c6b4f0c21b6c184886d5056f46ca26908540ec07b82ad47e667971a01fac6162e93a7fc61aed5660f826aeba34d78accd18fc59e7921701f10ff51d52883706b864287cfdb34e309c93829d29d867c9

with open("out",'rb') as f:
    c=f.read()
    m=bytes_to_long(c)
    print(long_to_bytes(pow(m,d,n)))

"""30 
82 025c 
0201 00 
02 81 81 00bd278484122aef9a69ec647290219ded06edd2b7611721b326850b2f5060daeed7694356667c479ca9ccb6969f4fbe6dc7fa6759aca21d8a96a881a8e4a0217732757e649d503191511fa96da42ed1da2fa3bc8c9c65fbd9c0dd6f430359ac45e455d32c5b0ea29d21e647ff80e50abcbb80f76adb67007a04e85dbaeb4c8f1d
02 03 010001
02 81 80 2265e355593071ae3501062b4746b5bf7af918cebc5b46879bc3aa0b0aa4f26b68c4fdb7e29f4b2e943a6421f40abe689c6b4f0c21b6c184886d5056f46ca26908540ec07b82ad47e667971a01fac6162e93a7fc61aed5660f826aeba34d78accd18fc59e7921701f10ff51d52883706b864287cfdb34e309c93829d29d867c9
02 41 00c6e091a25cd8e75937af8370674f71ff000ce87a49a8374e654fe3b1877c63813c895c3cb83da4c3bc457aeedef78574bba69b1ac3a21d3fcd0b3a1ffa05aa93
02 41 00f37c0714f1d2e836e73a806ddb3509245539ceb363623d3e4f7887456580519cb513f6564508c8d5ea6b9ccb0b67b58168243bb96d61e8db6377413bbb95fd8f

02404e066d1cb630a3136db57e6beb1c5
02d2b67e50d953859fa77e50fffe697f6b20d7e16a1fbe6b36dd7bfaaab6ceecf7d2ce200984f889ad11d30fa6cf13aa7e1
024100a3c4583f0e27fd68703e3903aadd11390ed9c2dd858b1e063b0da66e56c6e81daeedae52783c60590143404291793febba5
0249ba3a6a72868ce5d61ffd9f2a1
0240369cfe9a217
02c39b0d07fdf8a4d82fe362177dd92fc82
02d699914b9a634016f6e30e270bde8c2d0068743a77d2fa8831cba75536e0f2f1578ddd4e4b5e7685"""

rabin

from Crypto.Util.number import *


flag=b"BaseCTF{}"
m = bytes_to_long(flag)

p = getPrime(512)
q = getPrime(512)
assert p%4==3 and q%4==3
n = p*q
e = 4

c = pow(m,e,n)
print("p=",p)
print("q=",q)
print("n=",n)
print("c=",c)
print("e=",e)
"""
p= 8531212975719216550108614256955774722172741885676113601617182716356239301381951899737237219659253655889636684200345109462928796329670321336864298557778843
q= 7443256287912111739335729314443559886458007838130371799255078565502662459436043455787869631999073617967343884377537828940738213460508765519478956421282871
n= 63500004625039456439237191267891267558404574431112995926594213383621331385226487443753506088788203040258384788149958095020759745138424276657604371402824844725005596890673468964961037168078105356669148960568974603581485045691990626520286184874115519591663033533771400334558853058140717812903874350138362098253
c= 51452608438757130697131508192775727191605112918772187364577097224326062184288501602000700342623122861398852536963355962672293705131887315354242193416090384360837672258861475017098419459125395949090523474744886423754439919504732741712693909507972791203801494594878447921609420574365853676576693694677914169353
e= 4
"""

高次rabin攻击

详见:文章列表 | NSSCTF

\[c\equiv m^4\equiv x^2\mod n\\ c\equiv m^4\equiv x^2\mod p\quad说明c是模p下的二次剩余\\ 可得这条结论c^{\frac{p-1}{2}}\equiv 1\mod p\\ (详细证明看上面NSSCTF中xenny师傅的文章)\\ x^2\equiv c\equiv c^{\frac{p-1}{2}}*c\equiv c^{\frac{p+1}{2}}\mod p\\ 由条件p\equiv3\mod4,可知c^{\frac{p+1}{2}}可以进行开方\\ 得:x_1\equiv c^{\frac{p+1}{4}}\mod p和x_2\equiv(p-c^{\frac{p+1}{4}})\mod p\\ 同理得:x_3\equiv c^{\frac{q+1}{4}}\mod q和x_4\equiv(q-c^{\frac{q+1}{4}})\mod q\\ 之后对x_1,x_2,x_3,x_4都再进行一次rabin就可以得到16个m_i\\ 进行筛选可得最终flag \]

from Crypto.Util.number import *
import math

p= 7069399887135404147313451925856463790122288322955120353958439275669624760478622857767374372872346990136954266792268812402268519788981659317134531701377703
q= 7140401794925570651681210965995716787861669619864423417950517149172165700476247742598189428763096590450485848849559705021102255619953633260576326755189491
n= 50478355643148266354923007679620780526141911052216183219350733856301203909504117920782157926474133059342037694939720794471142298089233400685616528009799838411628460021560455031638939642439782783664643276781622313533393143794433785002028042268329216889290321025657400866309989050114906562764560145969527319173
c= 4087656016708624348430154736700209864616058176527780296412388210036556189223356217878476122554309456912053098904757651242467846016533157893713565869179648449607552843430116377433424175512165110689917185788645907642250661954679293286430479127383793220643392349769864898681882146542120386576626400193522553192
e= 16
  
def rabin(c):
    m1 = pow(c, (p + 1) // 4, p)
    m2 = p-pow(c, (p + 1) // 4, p)
    m3 = pow(c, (q + 1) // 4, q)
    m4 = q-pow(c, (q + 1) // 4, q)

    return m1,m2,m3,m4

cs = [c]
lge=math.log(e,2)
for i in range(int(lge)):	#range里放log2e
    t = set()
    for c2 in cs:
        x = rabin(c2)
        for j in x:
            t.add(j)
    cs = list(t)
for i in cs:
    flag=long_to_bytes(i)
    if b'BaseCTF' in flag:
        print(flag)
#BaseCTF{01c28b9c-7924-4c04-b71d-1cca15342618}


extendmd5

from Crypto.Util.number import *
import hashlib
import socketserver
import signal
import os
import random 
flag = os.getenv('GZCTF_FLAG')


class Task(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler):
    def _recvall(self):
        BUFF_SIZE = 2048
        data = b''
        while True:
            part = self.request.recv(BUFF_SIZE)
            data += part
            if len(part) < BUFF_SIZE:
                break
        return data.strip()

    def send(self, msg, newline=True):
        try:
            if newline:
                msg += b'\n'
            self.request.sendall(msg)
        except:
            pass

    def recv(self):
        return self._recvall()

    def my_md5(self,text):
        mymd5=hashlib.md5()
        mymd5.update(text)
        return mymd5.hexdigest()
    def handle(self):
        signal.alarm(30)

        c=random.randint(1,64)
        want=random.randbytes(c)
        want_md5=self.my_md5(want)
        self.send(want_md5.encode())

        while True:
            self.send(b"\nPlease input the secret:")
            secret = self.recv()

            final=want+secret
            final_md5=self.my_md5(final)

            self.send(b"\nPlease input your md5:")
            your_md5=self.recv().decode()
            if  final_md5 == your_md5:
                self.send(flag.encode())
                break
        
            
        self.send(b"\nConnection has been closed  =.=  ")
        self.request.close()


class ThreadedServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
    pass


class ForkedServer(socketserver.ForkingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
    pass


if __name__ == "__main__":
    HOST, PORT = '0.0.0.0', 9999
    server = ForkedServer((HOST, PORT), Task)
    server.allow_reuse_address = True
    server.serve_forever()

(前言:循环100次单纯想检验一下写代码解决,而不是直接用别人的脚本生成一个结果就好了,所以可能会有点恶心,请见谅)

就是放在密码里得md5扩展攻击

原始内容长度是随机,爆破一下就可以了。

(以下原理讲的可能不是很清楚,可以看结合第二周web中的视频讲解观看)

原理:

首先需要从md5加密过程开始说起,md5加密是分组进行加密的,每组512bits。在一开始,需要对明文进行填充,如果最后分组不满512bits的需要填充到512bits;如果原始内容刚刚好可以分组,那也需要填充一个512bits的分组。md5扩展攻击最重要的就是理解填充规则。

填充规则:

首先添加一个固定字节b'\x80',之后需要填充由原始明文长度计算得来的8个字节,这8个字节是一定需要填充的,所以如果这个时候明文已经到达了57bytes,再填充8字节就会不再是刚好的64bytes(512bits),所以这时候我们要新添一个分组。最后八字节为原始明文长度,填充方式为小端序。

比如len=10,先填上个b'\x80',这时候长度为11,可以填充8字节,那么再填充b'\x00'*(64-8-1-10),64为一个分组的字节数,8为最后需要填充的数据,1是最开始填充的b'\x80',最后填充八个字节为b'\x50\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'。

比如len=33,先填上个b'\x80',那么再填充b'\x00'*(64-8-1-33),最后填充八个字节为b'\x08\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'。原始数据为264bits,验证:0x108=264

比如len=56,先填上个b'\x80',这时候有57字节,再填充8字节的话为65字节,那么不满足分组条件,所以这时候我们需要再填充b'\x00'*(64*2-8-1-56),也就是63个0字节,最后填充八个字节为b'\xc0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00。原始数据为448bits,验证:0x01c0=448

当我们填充完数据后,从第一个分组开始进行md5加密,加密过程可以不用在意,只需知道每次加密后得到32个16六进制,加密后的结果分成四组,当成下一个分组加密的IV,这是攻击的关键。

一开始,我们知道原始内容的md5值,并且原始内容长度小于64字节。这时候,服务器我们可以在原始内容后面添加自定义数据,那么最重要的就是,根据填充规则,我们只要知道原始内容长度,我们就可以自己进行填充,只要我们自己填充的数据与md5加密时一样,最后计算出的md5值也会一样,那么这个结果是作为下一组内容加密时的IV。

所以我们像服务器发送数据为:填充内容+任意内容

最后发送 任意内容的md5结果,当然这里需要根据服务器一开始传来的md5值作为IV来进行加密

这里我用GPT生成了一份md5加密代码,在加密时传送进去IV值,最重要的是,我这份源码是原始的md5加密代码,我们需要在”任意内容“前填上64bytes*分组数,而且在加密函数(my_md5)中,我们只要最后一个分组的结果,所以我们需要跳过前面几个分组(在代码中skip变量处体现)

from pwn import *

import struct
import math

# 定义MD5所需的常量
T = [int(4294967296 * abs(math.sin(i + 1))) & 0xFFFFFFFF for i in range(64)]


# 定义左旋转函数
def left_rotate(x, c):
    return (x << c) | (x >> (32 - c))


# 定义MD5主循环所需的四个基本函数
def F(x, y, z):
    return (x & y) | (~x & z)


def G(x, y, z):
    return (x & z) | (y & ~z)


def H(x, y, z):
    return x ^ y ^ z


def I(x, y, z):
    return y ^ (x | ~z)


# 定义MD5算法
def my_md5(message, A, B, C, D, skip):
    # 初始化变量
    a, b, c, d = A, B, C, D

    # 填充消息
    original_length = len(message) * 8
    message += b'\x80'
    while (len(message) * 8) % 512 != 448:
        message += b'\x00'
    message += struct.pack('<Q', original_length)

    # 处理每个512位(64字节)块
    # 跳过前几个分组
    for i in range(64 * skip, len(message), 64):
        block = message[i:i + 64]
        X = struct.unpack('<16I', block)

        # 备份当前的a, b, c, d值
        AA, BB, CC, DD = a, b, c, d
        # 进行四轮操作,每轮16步
        for i in range(64):
            if 0 <= i <= 15:
                k, s, func = i, [7, 12, 17, 22][i % 4], F(b, c, d)
            elif 16 <= i <= 31:
                k, s, func = (5 * i + 1) % 16, [5, 9, 14, 20][i % 4], G(b, c, d)
            elif 32 <= i <= 47:
                k, s, func = (3 * i + 5) % 16, [4, 11, 16, 23][i % 4], H(b, c, d)
            elif 48 <= i <= 63:
                k, s, func = (7 * i) % 16, [6, 10, 15, 21][i % 4], I(b, c, d)

            temp = b + left_rotate((a + func + X[k] + T[i]) & 0xFFFFFFFF, s)
            a, b, c, d = d, temp & 0xFFFFFFFF, b, c

        # 将结果加到当前的a, b, c, d
        a = (a + AA) & 0xFFFFFFFF
        b = (b + BB) & 0xFFFFFFFF
        c = (c + CC) & 0xFFFFFFFF
        d = (d + DD) & 0xFFFFFFFF
    # 返回哈希结果
    return struct.pack('<4I', a, b, c, d).hex()


rem = remote("challenge.basectf.fun", 33573)

for _ in range(100):
    want_md5 = rem.recv(32).decode()  # 接收原始数据的md5

    # 计算成iv
    iv = []
    for i in range(4):
        tmp = ""
        for j in range(4):
            tmp += want_md5[(i + 1) * 8 - (j + 1) * 2:(i + 1) * 8 - j * 2]
        iv.append(int(tmp, 16))

    # 爆破长度
    for i in range(32, 64):
        rem.recvuntil(b"Please input the secret:")

        # 填充消息
        payload = b''
        payload_length = i * 8
        payload += b'\x80'
        while ((i + len(payload)) * 8) % 512 != 448:
            payload += b'\x00'
        payload += struct.pack('<Q', payload_length)
        payload += b'naby'

        rem.sendline(payload)

        # 计算填充数据后的有几个分组,需要跳过计算
        skip = (i + len(payload) - 4) // 64
        A, B, C, D = iv
        message = b'a' * (64 * skip) + b'naby'
        res = my_md5(message, A, B, C, D, skip)
        rem.recvuntil(b"Please input your md5:")
        rem.sendline(res.encode())
        rem.recvline()
        m = rem.recvline()
        if b'correct' in m:
            print(_, want_md5, i, m)
            break

rem.interactive()

Fin

猜猜看

from Crypto.Util.number import *
import socketserver
import numpy as np
import random
import ast
import os
flag = os.getenv('GZCTF_FLAG').encode()
class Task(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler):
    def _recvall(self):
        BUFF_SIZE = 2048
        data = b''
        while True:
            part = self.request.recv(BUFF_SIZE)
            data += part
            if len(part) < BUFF_SIZE:
                break
        return data.strip()

    def send(self, msg, newline=True):
        try:
            if newline:
                msg += b'\n'
            self.request.sendall(msg)
        except:
            pass

    def recv(self):
        return self._recvall()
    
    def handle(self):
        assert len(flag)==45
        self.send(b"hello.")

        m=bytes_to_long(flag)
        m=bin(m)[2:]

        length=len(m)

        x=np.array([int(i) for i in m])
        T=np.array([[random.getrandbits(1) for _ in range(length)] for __ in range(length)])

        y=np.dot(x,T)
        self.send(str(list(y)).encode())

        while True:
            user_input=ast.literal_eval(self.recv().strip().decode('utf-8'))
            if isinstance(user_input,list):
                try:
                    mat=np.array(user_input)
                    res=list(np.dot(mat,T))
                    self.send(str(res).encode())
                except:
                    self.send(b'wrong!!')
            else:
                self.send(b'wrong!')
                break
        

        self.send(b"\nConnection has been closed  =.=  ")
        self.request.close()


class ThreadedServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
    pass


class ForkedServer(socketserver.ForkingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
    pass


if __name__ == "__main__":
    HOST, PORT = '0.0.0.0', 9999
    server = ForkedServer((HOST, PORT), Task)
    server.allow_reuse_address = True
    server.serve_forever()

灵感来自借nss3rd研究MT19937题目时想出来的点子。

参考:浅析MT19937伪随机数生成算法-安全客 - 安全资讯平台 (anquanke.com)

有提到一个黑盒测试,通过矩阵乘法的性质,利用左乘一个只有一个1,其他都位0的矩阵,可以得到右矩阵的某一行。

import numpy as np
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from pwn import *
p=remote()
p.recvline()
flag=eval(p.recvline())
length=45*8-1
T=[]
for i in range(length):
    x=[0]*i+[1]+[0]*(length-1-i)
    p.sendline(str(x).encode())
    T.append(eval(p.recvline()))
T=np.array(T)
t_ni=np.linalg.inv(T)

m=np.dot(flag,t_ni)
m=np.round(m)
flag=""
for i in m:
    if i==1:
        flag+='1'
    else:
        flag+='0'
print(long_to_bytes(int(flag,2)))

p.interactive()

ECB是不安全的

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from Crypto.Util.Padding import *
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
import socketserver
import os
import base64
flag = os.getenv('GZCTF_FLAG').encode()
class Task(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler):
    def _recvall(self):
        BUFF_SIZE = 2048
        data = b''
        while True:
            part = self.request.recv(BUFF_SIZE)
            data += part
            if len(part) < BUFF_SIZE:
                break
        return data.strip()

    def send(self, msg, newline=True):
        try:
            if newline:
                msg += b'\n'
            self.request.sendall(msg)
        except:
            pass

    def recv(self):
        return self._recvall()
    
    def handle(self):

        self.send(b"the server will connect you entered to the front of flag.")
        self.send(b"then you will receive ciphertext(b64encode) encrypted by AES-ECB.")

        key=os.urandom(16)
        my_aes=AES.new(key=key,mode=AES.MODE_ECB)
        self.send(base64.b64encode(my_aes.encrypt(pad(flag,AES.block_size))))

        while True:
            self.send(b':')
            cin=self.recv()
            final=cin+flag
            self.send(base64.b64encode(my_aes.encrypt(pad(final,AES.block_size))))

            
        self.send(b"\nConnection has been closed  =.=  ")
        self.request.close()


class ThreadedServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
    pass


class ForkedServer(socketserver.ForkingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
    pass


if __name__ == "__main__":
    HOST, PORT = '0.0.0.0', 9999
    server = ForkedServer((HOST, PORT), Task)
    server.allow_reuse_address = True
    server.serve_forever()

灵感来源之前国外的一场,也没有给源码,甚至没有提示。

后面在cryptohack上也遇到了,就拿来出了一题。

这题我们可以在原始内容前面加上 任意内容。

通过测试AES加密的密文,我们可以知道flag的长度。

之后有两种方法,exp里都有写,但是从后往前爆破flag的也个点我没搞懂就先不讲了,只讲从前往后的。

先讲利用原理:ECB模式中,算法对每一个分组进行加密,与前后分组无关,当密钥固定之后,只要这一个分组的明文相同,那么加密之后的密文也相同。

这里直接举个例子。

比如flag是BaseCTF{0123456789},长度为19.一开始服务器给我们发送密文(base64解密之后)为32字节,为两个AES-ECB分组。我们给服务器依次发送1-16字节的数据,发送一个1字节时,服务器加密20字节,最后密文还是32字节;当发送14字节时,服务器加密33字节,最后密文为48字节,发生了变化,在这时,我们就可以计算出flag长度为32-(14-1)=19。

之后利用刚刚讲的原理,我们发送flag长度填充到一个AES-ECB分组长度减一的内容,比如这里我们发送31字节的a,这时候服务器加密:

\(aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa|aaaaaaaaaaaaaaB|aseCTF\{0123456789\}\)

之后我们爆破flag的第一个字节,少发送一个字节,这时候服务器加密:

\(aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa|aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa?|BaseCTF\{0123456789\}\)

当我们爆破到这个字节为B时,服务器加密的第二个分组跟我们第一次发送的第二个分组相同,产生的密文也就相同,那么就可以推断出爆破成功,之后发送数据就要连带上爆破出来的flag。

这里在举爆破一个分组长度后的例子:

此时我们需要爆破flag的第17字节,我们已知flag的前16字节,我们发送(31-16)=15字节的a,得到:

\(aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaB|aseCTF\{012345678|9\}\)

之后爆破第17位,此时发送数据需要带上flag,这是我们发送的数据aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaB|aseCTF{01234567?,最后得到:

\(aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaB|aseCTF\{01234567?|BaseCTF\{0123456789\}\)

from pwn import *
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import base64
p=remote()

print(p.recvline())
print(p.recvline())

c=p.recvline()[:-1]
c=base64.b64decode(c)

length1=0
for i in range(16):
    p.recvline()    # b":\n"
    payload=b'a'*i
    p.sendline(payload)
    d=p.recvline()[:-1]
    d=base64.b64decode(d)
    if len(d)!=len(c):
        length1=i
        break
length_flag=len(c)-length1
print(length_flag)

# 从前往后爆破flag
payload_length=len(c)+16     # 多一个分组保容错
flag=b''
for i in range(payload_length-1,payload_length-1-length_flag,-1):
    p.recvline()    # b":\n"
    payload=b'a'*i
    p.sendline(payload)
    d=p.recvline()[:-1]
    d=base64.b64decode(d)
    for j in range(33,128):
        p.recvline()    # b":\n"
        payload1=b'a'*i+flag+chr(j).encode()
        p.sendline(payload1)
        e=p.recvline()[:-1]
        e=base64.b64decode(e)
        e=e[payload_length-16:payload_length]
        if e in d:
            flag+=chr(j).encode()
            break
    print(flag)

"""# 从后往前爆破flag(此方法需要知道填充模式)
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
from Crypto.Cipher import AES

# 在前面填充到满足AES加密的分组长度
dic='{}-BCTF0123456789abcdef'
flag=b''
for i in range(length_flag):
    p.recvline()    # b":\n"
    server_payload=b'a'*(length1+i+1)
    p.sendline(server_payload)
    server_flag=p.recvline()[:-1]
    server_flag=base64.b64decode(server_flag)
    
    for j in dic:
        p.recvline()    # b":\n"
        my_payload=j.encode()+flag
        my_payload=pad(my_payload,AES.block_size)
        my_payload=my_payload+b'a'  # 我也不知道这里为什么要多加一个字节,当i=2时不加这个字节就会出错
        p.sendline(my_payload)
        my_flag=p.recvline()[:-1]
        my_flag=base64.b64decode(my_flag)
        my_flag=my_flag[:16]
        
        if my_flag in server_flag:
            flag=j.encode()+flag
            
            break
    print(flag)"""

p.interactive()

の歪来

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import *

flag=b''
assert len(flag)==28
m=bytes_to_long(flag)

n=getPrime(2048)
e=32

c=pow(m,e,n)


print("n =",n)
print("e =",e)
print("c =",c)

AMM开根

论文在这里:1111.4877 (arxiv.org)

我还没搞懂,所以直接套用了板子。

我出这题只是想着AMM的常规板子是两个素数求解然后求CRT,我就改成了一个素数,然后小m可以直接得到。

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import *
import random
import math


p = 17363249226879909675667629533972233798566313669420563155296918020175446973456428454735263489044575257132690882883587342817653451483222705760704890265900885255972067349104579938808591608382992680533327518070878297438339884996059309549300942570104747348751766711833983705979880714174709047335147739991850385244159235504375559144283494800573079055547597410783559965162216203307100248001158445665271438067670522510991047688414176659907164436539491205637933681658814267567385232097679554282863595183422504494357205180093828786415060565003183966959273253039416986816444073158723191290806413175478175738266995214965220231649
e = 32
c = 6840453756562205147103219479843999687625029691496635689045074720240615321966887831642035124198445485320265097191334720798522097422084141332044111764558336174743819347952914775206809737198058220362381349481027893609144697054465070779290329222696236671374412706789862193871687821041053566873553189148668599841084370137084893575567622972476409755187388121177923217208552049876944055745912987536390075417261016809335539362984984190264791744790640858201038207982043569204062714722892105134794280417020318408200038144689432974312283915592134911446185412636709207566063730723406969727969141426530341540330398465744403597273
def onemod(e, q):
    p = random.randint(1, q-1)
    while(powmod(p, (q-1)//e, q) == 1):  # (r,s)=1
        p = random.randint(1, q)
    return p

def AMM_rth(o, r, q):  # r|(q-1
    assert((q-1) % r == 0)
    p = onemod(r, q)

    t = 0
    s = q-1
    while(s % r == 0):
        s = s//r
        t += 1
    k = 1
    while((s*k+1) % r != 0):
        k += 1
    alp = (s*k+1)//r

    a = powmod(p, r**(t-1)*s, q)
    b = powmod(o, r*a-1, q)
    c = powmod(p, s, q)
    h = 1

    for i in range(1, t-1):
        d = powmod(int(b), r**(t-1-i), q)
        if d == 1:
            j = 0
        else:
            j = (-math.log(d, a)) % r
        b = (b*(c**(r*j))) % q
        h = (h*c**j) % q
        c = (c*r) % q
    result = (powmod(o, alp, q)*h)
    return result

def ALL_Solution(m, q, rt, cq, e):
    mp = []
    for pr in rt:
        r = (pr*m) % q
        # assert(pow(r, e, q) == cq)
        mp.append(r)
    return mp


def calc(mp, mq, e, p, q):
    i = 1
    j = 1
    t1 = invert(q, p)
    t2 = invert(p, q)
    for mp1 in mp:
        for mq1 in mq:
            j += 1
            if j % 100000 == 0:
                print(j)
            ans = (mp1*t1*q+mq1*t2*p) % (p*q)
            if check(ans):
                return
    return


def check(m):
    try:
        a = long_to_bytes(m)
        if b'NSSCTF' in a:
            print(a)
            return True
        else:
            return False
    except:
        return False


def ALL_ROOT2(r, q):  # use function set() and .add() ensure that the generated elements are not repeated
    li = set()
    while(len(li) < r):
        p = powmod(random.randint(1, q-1), (q-1)//r, q)
        li.add(p)
    return li

cp = c % p

mp = AMM_rth(cp, e, p)

rt1 = ALL_ROOT2(e, p) 
amp = ALL_Solution(mp, p, rt1, cp, e)

for i in amp:
    m=long_to_bytes(i)
    if b'BaseCTF' in m:
        print(m)
        break

老涩批了

from Crypto.Util.number import *
import socketserver
import os
import uuid 
flag = os.getenv('GZCTF_FLAG').encode()

class Task(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler):
    def _recvall(self):
        BUFF_SIZE = 2048
        data = b''
        while True:
            part = self.request.recv(BUFF_SIZE)
            data += part
            if len(part) < BUFF_SIZE:
                break
        return data.strip()

    def send(self, msg, newline=True):
        try:
            if newline:
                msg += b'\n'
            self.request.sendall(msg)
        except:
            pass

    def recv(self):
        return self._recvall()

    def handle(self):
        
        p=getPrime(256)
        q=getPrime(256)
        n=p*q
        e=65537
        d=inverse(e,(p-1)*(q-1))

        text=b'BaseCTF{'+str(uuid.uuid4()).encode()+b'}'

        m1=bytes_to_long(text[:len(text)//2])
        c1=pow(m1,e,n)

        m2=bytes_to_long(text[len(text)//2:])
        c2=pow(m2,e,n)

        self.send(b'n = '+str(n).encode())
        self.send(b'e = '+str(e).encode())
        self.send(b'c1 = '+str(c1).encode())
        self.send(b'c2 = '+str(c2).encode())

        while True:
            select=self.recv().strip()
            if select==b'1':
                c=int(self.recv().decode().strip())
                m=pow(c,d,n)
                res=m&1
            elif select==b'2':
                c=int(self.recv().decode().strip())
                m=pow(c,d,n)
                res=long_to_bytes(m,64)[0]
            elif select==b'3':
                user_text=self.recv().strip()
                if user_text==text:
                    self.send(flag)
                    break
                else:
                    self.send(b'try again')
                    break
            else :
                self.send(b'wrong')
                break
            self.send(str(res).encode())
        self.send(b"\nConnection has been closed  =.=  ")
        self.request.close()


class ThreadedServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
    pass


class ForkedServer(socketserver.ForkingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer):
    pass


if __name__ == "__main__":
    HOST, PORT = '0.0.0.0', 9999
    server = ForkedServer((HOST, PORT), Task)
    server.allow_reuse_address = True
    server.serve_forever()

参考了La佬的博客:RSA | Lazzaro (lazzzaro.github.io)

说明一下出题:没点子了,就逛ctfwiki上看到了这个,然后搜了一圈只找到了LSB的代码,MSB没有,我就顺便结合起来了,然后由于GZ这里每个队伍开不同容器flag还是一样的,为了防止多次加密不安全,所以套了一下,先道个歉。

原理我就不献丑了,可以去看看佬们的博客。

from Crypto.Util.number import *
import decimal
from pwn import *
from time import *
rem=remote()
rem.recvuntil(b'n = ')
n=int(rem.recvline().decode().strip())

rem.recvuntil(b'e = ')
e=int(rem.recvline().decode().strip())

rem.recvuntil(b'c1 = ')
c1=int(rem.recvline().decode().strip())

rem.recvuntil(b'c2 = ')
c2=int(rem.recvline().decode().strip())
def server_decode1(c):
    rem.sendline(b'1')
    sleep(0.01)
    rem.sendline(str(c).encode())
    rec=rem.recvline().strip()
    return rec
kbits = n.bit_length()
decimal.getcontext().prec = kbits
L = decimal.Decimal(0)
R = decimal.Decimal(int(n))
for i in range(kbits):
    c1 = (c1 * pow(2, e, n)) % n
    recv = server_decode1(c1)
    if recv == b'1':
        L = (L + R) // 2
    else:
        R = (L + R) // 2
flag1=long_to_bytes(int((R)))
print(flag1)
sleep(0.01)
def server_decode2(c):
    rem.sendline(b'2')
    sleep(0.01)
    rem.sendline(str(c).encode())
    rec=rem.recvline().strip()
    return rec
k=1
while True:
    c22 = (c2 * pow(2, e*k, n)) % n
    res=server_decode2(c22)
    res=int(res)
    if res&1:
        break
    k=k+1
L=2**(k-1)
R=2**k

while True:
    if R-L==1:
        break
    x=(L+R)//2
    c22 = (c2 * pow(x, e, n)) % n
    res=server_decode2(c22)
    res=int(res)
    if res:
        R=x
    else :
        L=x
flag2=(2**(kbits-8)//L)
print(long_to_bytes(flag2))
user_text=flag1[:-1]+b'-'+long_to_bytes(flag2)
print(user_text)
rem.sendline(b'3')
sleep(0.01)
rem.sendline(user_text)


rem.interactive()

PDP

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import *
import hashlib
import hmac
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
from random import *

def KeyGen():
    while True:
        pp=getPrime(512)
        p=2*pp+1
        while not isPrime(p):
            pp=getPrime(512)
            p=2*pp+1

        qq=getPrime(512)
        q=2*qq+1
        while not isPrime(q):
            qq=getPrime(512)
            q=2*qq+1
        
        if pp!=qq:
            break
    n=p*q
    phi=(p-1)*(q-1)

    e=getPrime(1024)
    d=invert(e,phi)

    v=getRandomNBitInteger(128)

    g=e**2%n

    return (n,g,e,d,v)

def TagBlock(n,g,d,v):
    f=open("ABigFile",'rb')
    F=f.read()
    f.close()
    b_size=64   # 64B

    block_count=len(F)//b_size + (0 if len(F)%b_size==0 else 1)

    W=[]
    tags=[]
    for i in range(block_count):
        Wi=str(v)+str(i)
        W.append(Wi)

        block=bytes_to_long(F[i*b_size:(i+1)*b_size])

        my_md5=hashlib.md5()
        my_md5.update(Wi.encode())
        tags.append(pow((int(my_md5.hexdigest(),16)*pow(g,block,n))%n,d,n))
    return (W,tags)

def GenProof(n,g):
    c=randint(400,500)
    k1=getRandomNBitInteger(256)
    k2=getRandomNBitInteger(160)
    s=getRandomNBitInteger(16)
    return (c,k1,k2,s,pow(g,s,n))

def gen_proof(n,tags,c,k1,k2,gs,judge=0):
    f=open("ABigFile",'rb')
    F=f.read()
    f.close()
    b_size=64   # 64B

    if judge:
        listF=list(F)
        X=[]
        for i in range(len(F)//100):
            x=randint(0,len(F)-1)
            while listF[x]==0:
                x=randint(0,len(F)-1)
            X.append(x)
            listF[x]=0
        F=b''
        for i in listF:
            F+=long_to_bytes(i)

    block_count=len(F)//b_size + (0 if len(F)%b_size==0 else 1)
    T=1
    temp=0
    for j in range(c):
        my_aes=AES.new(long_to_bytes(k1),mode=AES.MODE_ECB)
        i=my_aes.encrypt(pad(long_to_bytes(j),AES.block_size))
        i=bytes_to_long(i)%block_count

        my_sha256=hashlib.sha256
        my_hmac=hmac.new(long_to_bytes(k2),digestmod=my_sha256)
        my_hmac.update(long_to_bytes(j))
        a=int(my_hmac.hexdigest(),16)%n

        T=(T*(pow(tags[i],a,n)))%n

        block=bytes_to_long(F[i*b_size:(i+1)*b_size])%n

        temp=temp+block*a
    temp=pow(gs,temp,n)
    my_sha1=hashlib.sha1()
    my_sha1.update(str(temp).encode())
    rho=int(my_sha1.hexdigest(),16)
    return (T,rho)

n,g,e,d,v=KeyGen()
with open("./output/key.txt",'w') as file:
    file.write(str(n)+'\n')
    file.write(str(e)+'\n')

W,tags=TagBlock(n,g,d,v)
with open("./output/W.txt","w") as file:
    for i in W:
        file.write(str(i))
        file.write('\n')

c,k1,k2,s,gs=GenProof(n,g)
with open("./output/chal.txt",'w') as file:
    file.write(str(c)+'\n')
    file.write(str(k1)+'\n')
    file.write(str(k2)+'\n')
    file.write(str(s)+'\n')

T,rho=gen_proof(n,tags,c,k1,k2,gs)
with open("./output/result.txt",'w') as file:
        file.write(str(T)+'\n')

flag_md5=hashlib.md5()
flag_md5.update(str(rho).encode())
print(b'BaseCTF{'+flag_md5.hexdigest().encode()+b'}')

我的毕设课题,正好感觉能出成一题就出了,具体不多说,详了解的可以看:naby1/S-PDP (github.com)

from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import *
import hashlib
import hmac
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
from random import *

def CheckProff(n,e,W,c,k1,k2,s,T):
    tau=pow(T,e,n)
    block_count=len(W)
    for j in range(c):
        my_aes=AES.new(long_to_bytes(k1),mode=AES.MODE_ECB)
        i=my_aes.encrypt(pad(long_to_bytes(j),AES.block_size))
        i=bytes_to_long(i)%block_count

        my_sha256=hashlib.sha256
        my_hmac=hmac.new(long_to_bytes(k2),digestmod=my_sha256)
        my_hmac.update(long_to_bytes(j))
        a=int(my_hmac.hexdigest(),16)%n

        Wi=str(W[i])
        my_md5=hashlib.md5()
        my_md5.update(Wi.encode())
        hw=pow(int(my_md5.hexdigest(),16),a,n)
        tau=(tau*invert(hw,n))%n
    tau=pow(tau,s,n)
    my_sha1=hashlib.sha1()
    my_sha1.update(str(tau).encode())
    tau=int(my_sha1.hexdigest(),16)
    flag_md5=hashlib.md5()
    flag_md5.update(str(tau).encode())
    print(b'BaseCTF{'+flag_md5.hexdigest().encode()+b'}')

with open("./output/key.txt",'r') as file:
    n=int(file.readline())
    e=int(file.readline())

W=[]
with open("./output/W.txt","r") as file:
    fl=file.readline()
    while fl:
        W.append(int(fl))
        fl=file.readline()

with open("./output/chal.txt",'r') as file:
    c=int(file.readline())
    k1=int(file.readline())
    k2=int(file.readline())
    s=int(file.readline())
T=234286400251524464112670458144913694525518333434039777508421611102466502545441606446799021254782625175811569624228349681696143431027926557585053651139957429856785510525021542033961575674601192776283321921860155347475439442726331189839563865687519551977156169783131926796425661730777079164446161030078497564104
CheckProff(n,e,W,c,k1,k2,s,T)

#BaseCTF{d198bce7a2f06ed24d3b043bddbd7512}

标签:my,self,BaseCTF2024,Crypto,flag,import,Fin,def,md5
From: https://www.cnblogs.com/naby/p/18415626

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